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ABSTRACT
Voice assistants like Siri enable us to control IoT devices conve-
niently with voice commands, however, they also provide new at-
tack opportunities for adversaries. Previous papers attack voice as-
sistants with obfuscated voice commands by leveraging the gap
between speech recognition system and human voice perception.
The limitation is that these obfuscated commands are audible and
thus conspicuous to device owners. In this paper, we propose a
novel mechanism to directly attack the microphone used for sens-
ing voice datawith inaudible voice commands. We show that the ad-
versary can exploit the microphone’s non-linearity and play well-
designed inaudible ultrasounds to cause the microphone to record
normal voice commands, and thus control the victim device in-
conspicuously. We demonstrate via end-to-end real-world exper-
iments that our inaudible voice commands can attack an Android
phone and an Amazon Echo device with high success rates at a
range of 2-3 meters.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Voice is becoming an increasingly popular input method for hu-
mans to interact with Internet of Things (IoT) devices. With the
help of microphones and speech recognition techniques, we can
talk to voice assistants, such as Siri, Google Now, Cortana and
Alexa for controlling smart phones, computers,wearables and other
IoT devices. Despite their ease of use, these voice assistants also
provide adversaries new attack opportunities to access IoT devices
with voice command injections.
Previous studies about voice command injections target the speech
recognition procedure. Vaidya et al. [1] design garbled audio sig-
nals to control voice assistants without knowing the speech recog-
nition system. Their approach obfuscates normal voice commands
by modifying some acoustic features so that they are not human-
understandable, but can still be recognized by victim devices. Car-
lini et al. [2] improve this black-box approach with more realistic
settings and propose a more powerful white-box attack method
based on knowledge of speech recognition procedure. Although
not human-recognizable, these obfuscated voice commands are still
conspicuous, as device owners can still hear the obfuscated sounds
and become suspicious.
In contrast, we propose a novel inaudible attack method by tar-
geting the microphone used for voice sensing by the victim device.
Due to the inherent non-linearity of the microphone, its output
signal contains “new” frequencies other than input signal’s spec-
trum. These “new” frequencies are not just integer multiples of
original frequencies, but also the sum and difference of original
input frequencies. Based on this security flaw, our attack scenario
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Inaudible Ultrasound Command Injection Microphone Recording at Victim Device
Figure 1: The attack scenario for inaudible voice commands.
is shown in Fig. 1. The adversary plays an ultrasound signal with
spectrum above 20kHz, which is inaudible to humans. Then the
victim device’s microphone processes this input, but suffers from
non-linearity, causing the introduction of new frequencies in the
audible spectrum. With careful design of the original ultrasound,
these new audible frequencies recorded by the microphone are in-
terpreted as actionable commands by voice assistant software.
In this paper, we put forward a detailed attack algorithm to ob-
tain inaudible voice commands and perform end-to-end real-world
experiments for validation. Our results show that the proposed in-
audible voice commands can attack an Android phone with 100%
success at a distance of 3 meters, and an Amazon Echo device with
80% success at a distance of 2 meters.
2 RELATED WORK
Recently, a few papers have proposed attacks against data-collecting
sensors. Son et al. [3] show that intentional resonant sounds can
disrupt the MEMS gyroscopes and cause drones to crash. Further-
more, by leveraging the circuit imperfections, Trippel et al. [4]
achieve control of the outputs of MEMS accelerometers with reso-
nant acoustic injections. Different from these approaches, we con-
sider the microphone’s non-linearity, so we do not need to find
the resonant frequency. Instead, we need to carefully design ultra-
sounds that are interpreted by microphones as normal voice com-
mands.
Roy et al. [5] conduct a similar work, where the non-linearity
of the microphone is exploited to realize inaudible acoustic data
communications and jamming of spying microphones. However,
their data communication method needs additional decoding pro-
cedures after the receiving microphone, and their jammingmethod
injects strong random noises to spying microphones. In contrast,
we consider a completely different scenario, where the target mi-
crophone needs no modification and its outputs have to be inter-
preted as target voice commands.
3 ULTRASOUND INJECTION ATTACKS
In our attack scenario, the goal is to obtain well-designed ultra-
sounds which are inaudible when played but can be recorded simi-
larly to normal commands at microphones. The victim can be any
common IoT device with an off-the-shelf microphone, and it does
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not need any modification, except adopting the always-on mode to
continuously listen for voice input, which has been used in many
IoT devices such as Amazon Echo. To perform an attack, the adver-
sary only needs to be physically proximate to the target and have
the control of a speaker to play ultrasound, which can be achieved
by either bringing an inconspicuous speaker close to the target or
using a position-fixed speaker to attack nearby devices.
3.1 Non-Linearity Insight
Transducer Amplifier
LPF ADC
Figure 2: Typical diagram of a microphone.
As shown in Fig. 2, a typical microphone consists of four mod-
ules. The transducer generates voltage variation proportional to
the sound pressure, which passes through the amplifier for signal
enlargement. The low-pass filter (LPF) is then adopted to filter out
high frequency components. Finally, the analog to digital converter
(ADC) is used for digitalization and quantization. Since the audible
sound frequency ranges from 20Hz to 20kHz, a typical sampling
rate forADC is 48kHz or 44.1kHz, and the filter’s cut-off frequency
is usually set about 20kHz .
To obtain a good-quality sound recording, the transducer and
the amplifier should be fabricated as linear as possible. However,
they still exhibit non-linear phenomena in practice. Assume the
input sound signal is Sin , the output signal after amplifier Sout
can be expressed as
Sout =
∞∑
i=1
GiS
i
in = G1Sin +G2S
2
in +G3S
3
in + · · · , (1)
where G1Sin is the linear term and dominates for input sound in
normal range. The other terms reflect the non-linearity and have
an impact for a large input amplitude, usually the third and higher
order terms are relatively weak compared to the second-order term.
The non-linearity introduces both harmonic distortion and in-
termodulation distortion to the output signal. Suppose the input
signal is sum of two tones with frequencies f1 and f2, i.e., Sin =
cos(2pi f1t) + cos(2pi f2t), the output due to the second-order term
is expressed as
G2S
2
in =G2 +
G2
2
(cos (2pi (2f1) t) + cos (2pi (2f2) t))
+G2 (cos (2pi (f1+ f2) t) + cos (2pi (f1− f2) t)) ,
(2)
which includes both harmonic frequencies 2f1, 2f2 and intermod-
ulation frequencies f1 ± f2.
Our attack intuition is to exploit the intermodulation to obtain
normal voice frequencies from the processing of ultrasound fre-
quencies. For example, if we play an ultrasound with two frequen-
cies 25kHz and 30kHz, the listening microphone will record the
signal with the frequency of 30kHz − 25kHz = 5kHz, while other
frequencies are filtered out by the LPF.
3.2 Attack Algorithm
Now, we present how this non-linearity can be leveraged to design
our attack ultrasound signals. Assume the signal of normal voice
command, such as “OK Google”, is Snormal . Our attack algorithm
contains the following steps.
Low-Pass Filtering
First we adopt a low-pass filter on the normal signal, with the
cut-off frequency as 8kHz to remove high frequency components.
Human speech is mainly concentrated on low frequency range,
and many speech recognition systems, such as CMU Sphinx, only
keep spectrum below 8kHz. Therefore, the filtering step can allow
us to adopt a lower carrier frequency for modulation, while still
preserving enough data of the original signal. Denote the filtered
signal as Sf il ter .
Upsampling
Usually, the normal voice command Snormal is recorded with
sampling rate of 48kHz (or 44.1kHz), the same as Sf il ter . This
sampling rate only supports generating ultrasoundwith frequency
ranging from 20kHz to 24kHz (or 22.05kHz), which is not enough.
To shift the whole spectrum of Sf il ter into inaudible frequency
range, the maximum ultrasound frequency should be no less than
28kHz. Thus, we derive an upsampled signal Sup with higher sam-
pling rate.
Ultrasound Modulation
In this step, we need to shift the spectrum of Sup into high fre-
quency range to be inaudible. Here, we adopt amplitude modula-
tion for spectrum shifting. Assuming the carrier frequency is fc ,
the modulation can be expressed as
Smodu = n1Sup cos(2pi fc t), (3)
where n1 is the normalized coefficient. The resulting modulated
signal contains two sidebands around the carrier frequency, rang-
ing from fc − 8kHz to fc + 8kHz. Therefore, fc should be at least
28kHz to be inaudible.
Carrier Wave Addition
Modulating the voice spectrum into inaudible frequency range
is not enough, they have to be translated back to normal voice fre-
quency range at the microphone for successful attacks. Without
modifying themicrophone, we can leverage its non-linear phenom-
enon to achieve demodulation by adding a suitable carrier wave,
and the final attack ultrasound can be expressed as
Sattack = n2(Smodu + cos(2pi fc t)), (4)
where n2 is used for signal normalization.
The above steps illustrate the entire process of obtaining an at-
tack ultrasound. Thiswell-designed inaudible signal Sattack , when
played by the attacker, can successfully inject a voice signal simi-
lar to Snormal at the target microphone and therefore control the
victim device inconspicuously.
4 EVALUATION
We perform real-world experiments to evaluate our proposed in-
audible voice commands. All of the following tests are performed
in a closed meeting room measuring approximately 6.5 meters by
4 meters, 2.5 meters tall. To play the attack ultrasound signals, we
first use a text-to-speech application to obtain the normal voice
commands and follow the described attack algorithmwith 192kHz
upsampling rate and 30kHz carrier frequency to get attack signals
in our laptop. Then a commodity audio amplifier [6] is connected
for power amplification, and the amplified signals are provided to
a tweeter speaker [7]. A video demo of the attack is available at
https://youtu.be/wF-DuVkQNQQ.
4.1 Attack Demonstration
We first validate the feasibility of our inaudible voice commands:
the normal voice command is “OK Google, take a picture”, and a
Nexus 5X running Android 7.1.2 is placed 2 meters away from the
speaker for recording.
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Figure 3: Time plots and spectrograms for the normal voice,
the attack ultrasound and the recording signal.
Fig. 3 presents the normal voice command, the attack ultrasound
and the recording sound in both time domain and frequency do-
main. We can see that the spectrum of attack ultrasound is above
20kHz, and after processing this ultrasound, themicrophone’s record-
ing sound is quite similar to the normal voice. When playing the
attack ultrasound, the phone is successfully activated and opens
the camera.
4.2 Attack Performance
We further examine our ultrasound attack range for two devices:
an Android phone and an Amazon Echo, where we try to spoof
voice commands “OK Google, turn on airplane mode”, and “Alexa,
add milk to my shopping list”, respectively. The following table
shows the relationship between the attack range and the speaker’s
input power. We can see that the attack range is positively corre-
lated to the speaker’s power. The attack range of our approach is
less for Amazon Echo compared to the Android phone, since its
microphone is plastic covered.
Table 1: The relationship between our attack range and the
speaker’s input power.
Input Power (Watt ) 9.2 11.8 14.8 18.7 23.7
Range (Phone, cm) 222 255 277 313 354
Range (Echo, cm) 145 168 187 213 239
We also check the attack accuracy by setting input power as
18.7W and placing phone and Echo 3m and 2m away, respectively.
For each device, we repeat the corresponding inaudible voice com-
mand every 10 seconds for 50 times. The attack success rates are
100%(50/50) for the Android phone and 80%(40/50) for the Ama-
zon Echo.
5 CONCLUSION
Based on the inherent non-linear properties of microphones, we
propose a novel attack method by transmitting well-design ultra-
sounds to control common voice assistants, like Siri, Google Now,
and Alexa. By taking advantage of intermodulation distortion and
amplitude modulation, our attack voice commands are inaudible
and achieve high success rates on an Android phone more than
three meters away and on an Amazon Echo device more than two
meters away.
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